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BURDEN OF PROOF AND THE PRIMA FACIE CASE:
THE EVOLVING HISTORY AND ITS APPLICATIONS
IN THE WTO JURISPRUDENCE
Ho Cheol Kim*
LL.M. Candidate, GULC
I. INTRODUCTION
The burden of proof is a procedural link between the facts sub-
mitted by parties and the ruling by the judicial body. The concept of
burden of proof in international procedure is defined as "the obligation
of each of the parties to a dispute before an international tribunal to
prove its claims to the satisfaction of, and in accordance with the rules
acceptable to, the tribunal."1
Why does it matter? In case of uncertainty, i.e. in case all the
evidence and arguments remain in equipoise, the panel is to "give the
benefit of the doubt" to the party who discharged its burden.2 In other
words, the rules on the burden of proof not only play a significant role
in controversial cases where evidence is unclear, they also enable the
panel to avoid the judicial pitfall of non-liquet.3 For this reason, the
rules on the burden of proof have prominence among practicing law-
yers and judges.
In the absence of written rules in the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the WTO treaty, the rules on the bur-
den of proof evolved remarkably from precedent, similar to the rule-
* The author expresses his deep gratitude to Professor Christopher Parlin, Pro-
fessor Jane Bradley, and Professor John Jackson for their full support and their
comments on earlier drafts of this article.
1 MOJTABA KAZAZI, BURDEN OF PROOF AND RELATED IssUEs: A STUDY ON EVIDENCE
BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 30 (1996).
2 Panel Report, United States - Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, 7.14,
WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999); see also PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POL-
ICY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 211 (Cam-
bridge Univ. Press) (2006).
3 See JULIANE KOKOTT, THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: CIVIL AND COMMON LAW APPROACHES WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE
TO THE AMERICAN AND GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEMS 157-60 (1998); See generally JOHN
H. JACKSON, SOVEREIGNTY, THE WTO AND CHANGING FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 172 (2006). (defining the concept of non liquet as "a situation where a
juridical body will simply, frankly, and explicitly decide not to decide an issue or
case" and stating that "[i]t is not clear that a non liquet is totally inappropriate or
forbidden in the WTO context, but there are those who feel that generally a judi-
cial body should not be permitted that liberty.").
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making approach in the common law system. The evolution of WTO
DSS decisions in the previous decade exemplify the trend toward
judge-made law, just as Article 3.8 of the Dispute Settlement Under-
standing (DSU) exemplified the "bottom-up approach."4 It is now ap-
propriate to review the history and current status of the rules
regarding burden of proof.
II. THE BOTTOM-UP TRIAL AND ERROR HISTORY
The burden of proof rests upon the party who makes the claim
(actori incumbit probation).5 In practice, this is an oversimplification.
While the burden of proof is often allocated to the claiming party, that
burden is shifted in certain circumstances. This makes the rules con-
fusing and somewhat murky.
Ironically, the efforts of the GATT and WTO to enhance the
rule-based system created these complexities. Similar to domestic
laws, the proper application of the burden proof has a significant im-
pact on the substantive rights and obligations of the parties.' The Ap-
pellate Body of WTO DSS uses burden of proof rules as a "quasi-
discretionary" tool to induce the defending party to comply with gen-
eral obligations.7 This is done by exempting the claimant from the ad-
4 JOHN H. JACKSON, WILLIAM J. DAVEY & ALAN 0. SYKES, JR., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT 276 (2002)
(concerning to the evolution of the need to establish nullification or impairment in
GATT dispute settlement, it explained that "a system of case-by-case decision
making gradually elaborated the sparse language of Article XXIII into a complex
set of rules, which in time were ratified by inclusion in the DSU Article 3.8". In
this regard, Professor Jackson labeled it as a "bottom up" approach which is quite
different from the normal "top down" procedure in the international context). See
generally Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1228 (1994) available at http://
www.wto.orglenglish/docs-e/legal-e/28-dsu.pdf ("In cases where there is an in-
fringement of the obligations assumed under a covered agreement, the action is
considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or impairment. This
means that there is normally a presumption that a breach of the rules has an
adverse impact on other Members parties to that covered agreement, and in such
cases, it shall be up to the Member against whom the complaint has been brought
to rebut the charge.").
5 See generally KAzAzI, supra note 1, at 116 ("The logical and legal concept of ac-
tori incumbit probation has generally been accepted and applied by international
tribunals.")
6 See KOKOTT, supra note 3, at 22.
7 Joost Pauwelyn, Evidence, Proof and Persuasion in WTO Dispute Settlement:
Who Bears the Burden?, I J. INT'L ECON. L. 227, 227 (noting that "to such extent
that they sometimes offer dispute settlement panels a welcome tool in deciding in
favour of one or the other party," a tool is "particularly attractive to adjudicators").
Meanwhile, the interrelation between rules on the burden of proof and the effec-
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ditional burden in order show the inconsistency with the exceptional
rule.8
This burden shifting relates to the allocation of procedural
power in the WTO DSS, because the power is based on the judicial
system itself, rather than on the consent of Member countries. The
question is whether member countries should accept such a duty im-
posed by an international institution.9 This causes tension between
the panel and the alleged party. Tension also arises between "predict-
ability and security" and "rebalancing," two goals of international dis-
pute settlement.10 Such tensions create both risks and opportunities
for WTO DSS. The need to balance and manage these tensions re-
sulted in more sophisticated rules.
The primary objective of this section is to demonstrate the de-
velopment of the rules on the burden of proof in WTO DSS and GATT
proceedings over the last decade. As new fact situations arise, this
development becomes a product of precedent.
A. Pre-History: GATT
The evolution of burden of proof in the GATT relates primarily
to "nullification and impairment." Originally, under GATT Article XX-
III, a breach of obligation was not enough to bring an action." Proof of"nullification or impairment" should be added by the complaining
party. This could be described as the "negotiation-oriented ap-
proach."1 2 In response to such an awkward phrase, the GATT panels
tive enforcement of substantive law has not yet been clearly explained under pub-
lic international law. KOKOrr, supra note 3, at 22.
8 KOKOrr, supra note 3, at 22.
9 JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: CONSTITUTION AND JURIS-
PRUDENCE 77 (1998).10 JACKSON, supra note 3, at 145-51 (listing twelve policy goals of international
dispute settlement).
11 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S 194 (Article XXIII provides that "[i]f any contracting party should con-
sider that any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly under this Agreement is
being nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the Agree-
ment is being impeded as the result of (a) the failure of another contracting party
to carry out its obligations under this Agreement, or (b) the application by another
contracting party of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of
this Agreement, or (c) the existence of any other situation, the contracting party
may, with a view to the satisfactory adjustment of the matter, make written repre-
sentations or proposals to the other contracting party or parties which it considers
to be concerned. Any contracting party thus approached shall give sympathetic
consideration to the representations or proposals made to it.").
12 See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM.: LAW AND POLICY OF INTER-
NATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 109, 114 (2nd ed. 1997) [hereinafter JACKSON,
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have gradually attenuated the effect of that expression. The panel of
Australia-Ammonium Sulphate introduced the concept of "reasonable
expectations."13 Subsequently in Uruguay-Recourse to Article XXIII,
the panel nullified the meaning of the phrase, holding that any "viola-
tion" of GATT would be considered a "prima facie nullification or im-
pairment."1 4 A 1987 panel report in the US-Superfund case stated that
"the presumption had in practice operated as an irrefutable presump-
tion."" Through incorporation of this view into DSU Article 3.8, the
member countries confirmed these well-established practices of the
GATT. 16
B. The Evolving History in the WTO DSS
The evolution of burden of proof in the GATT mainly concerned"nullification and impairment," while the WTO panels and appellate
reviews addressed the burden to prove "violation" in the context of two
goals: stability, achieved by deferring precedent, and fairness,
achieved by considering case specific facts.
The issue first arose in US-Wool Shirts and Blouses. 7 In this
case, India insisted the burden shift in accordance with Article 6 of the
Agreement on Textile and Clothing (ATC).' 8 The Appellate Body re-
fused to shift the burden accordingly. The Appellate Body did, how-
ever, set forth general rules regarding the burden of proof, stating, "it
is a generally accepted canon of evidence in civil law, common law and,
in fact, most jurisdictions, that the burden of proof rests upon the
party, whether complaining or defending, who asserts the affirmative
of a particular claim or defence." 9 The question then becomes, what is
an affirmative defense? The Appellate Body further stated, "several
GATT 1947 and WTO panels have required such proof of a party in-
LAW AND POLICY]; JACKSON, CONSTITUTION AND JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 9, at
66; JACKSON, SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 3, at 139 (stating that the use of ambigu-
ous phrase "nullification or impairment" implies the reflection of sovereignty ob-
jection against complete rule-oriented system).
13 Report of the Panel, The Australian Subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate, Annex
2-3, CP 4/39 (April, 3 1950), GATT B.I.S.D. (2d Supp.) at 188 (1950).
14 Report of the Panel, Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII, Y[ 15, L/1923 (Nov.
16, 1962), GATT B.I.S.D. (11th Supp.) at 95 (1962).
15 Report of the Panel, United States - Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported
Substances, L/617 (June 17, 1987) GATT B.I.S.D. 34S/136 (1987).
16 Meanwhile, the arguable discrepancy between the panel's decision in US-
Superfund and DSU Article 3.8 still remains.
17 Appellate Body Report, United States - Measuring Affecting Imports of Woven
Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, WT/DS33/AB/R (May 23, 1997) [hereinafter
US - Wool Shirts and Blouses].
18 Id.
19 Id.
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voking a defence, such as those found in Article XX or Article XI:2(c)(i),
to a claim of violation of a GATT obligation, such as those found in
Articles I:1, II:l, III or XI:1, [because] Articles XX and XI:(2)(c)(i) are
limited exceptions from obligations under certain other provisions of
the GATT 1994, not positive rules establishing obligations in them-
selves."20 Based on the words, "the members shall ensure" and the re-
verse presumption of Article 5.8, the Panel ruled that the Agreement
on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS
Agreement) allocates the "evidentiary burden [to] the Member impos-
ing an SPS measure."21 Additionally, the Panel ruled that, since "Arti-
cle 3.3 provides an exception to the general obligation contained in
Article 3.1," the burden to show that the measure is justified under
Article 3.3 is on the respondent. 22 Considering that it would be diffi-
cult for a claimant to prove another nation's SPS measure violated pro-
visions of the SPS agreement, it is obvious the Panel's decision was
based on notions of fairness. The Appellate Body objected to the
Panel's approach, instead distinguishing between the relation of a"general-exception" (GATT Article III and Article XX) and the relation
of a mere "exclusion" (SPS Article 3.1 and Article 3.3).23 Additionally,
it stated that "the general rule [on the burden of proof] is not avoided
by simply describing that same provision as an exception."24 In this
case, the Appellate Body played an important role. It further explained
the criteria necessary to apply the special rule on the burden of proof
and guarded the system against the immature and pragmatic inter-
pretation by the Panel.
But are the rules clear enough? Although it was strongly de-
bated in the recent EC-Biotech decision, the Appellate Body has yet to
develop a concrete standard for distinguishing between an "exception"
and a "right."25 The previous decisions of the Appellate Body are disor-
derly. In EC-Sardines, the Appellate Body noted that the "circum-
stances envisaged in the second part of Article 2.4 are excluded from
the scope of application of the first part of Article 2.4. "126 As with EC-
20 Id.
21 Appellate Body Report, United States - EC Measures Concerning Meat and
Meat Products, WT/DS26/AB/R, WTIDS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) [hereinafter US -
Hormones]. The original panel ruling was later overturned by the Appellate Body.
22 Id..
23 Id. The distinction between "exception" and "exclusion" will be discussed fur-
ther in part III.
24 Id.
25 Panel Report, European Communities - Measures Affecting the Approval and
Marketing of Biotech Products, 7.2923-3007, WT/DS291IR, WT/DS292/R, WT/
DS293/R (Sept. 29, 2006) [hereinafter EC - Biotech].
26 Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Trade Description of Sar-
dines, 275, WT/DS231IAB/R (Sept. 26, 2002) [hereinafter EC - Sardines].
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Hormones, there is no "general rule-exception relationship between
the first and the second parts of Article 2.4. "27 In contrast, in EC-
Tariff Preferences, the Appellate Body considered the Enabling Clause
to be an exception based on the use of the word "notwithstanding,"
stating that, "given the fundamental role of the Enabling Clause in the
WTO system as well as its contents," a complaining party must "iden-
tify those provisions of the Enabling Clause with which the scheme is
allegedly inconsistent."2  Some argue that, with regard to the appli-
cation of the burden of proof, "the Appellate Body's conclusions are
guided a bit by policy considerations."2 9 In other words, "the Appellate
Body may have chosen to apply the burden so as to give deference to
(1) domestic sovereignty in the trade remedies and SPS/TBT contexts;
and (2) developing countries and development policy.""° In my opin-
ion, however, the Appellate Body's allocation of the burden of proof is
primarily guided by its desire to strike a balance between state sover-
eignty and the authority of the WTO DSS. In previous decisions, the
Appellate Body considered "the importance of the provision" in addi-
tion to the classification of an "exception" to determine where the bur-
den should lie. In this regard, it may be more appropriate to interpret
the EC-Tariff Preferences decision as a failure to meet this second
standard.
On the other hand, the rules on what constitutes a prima facie
case are evolving. In earlier cases, the Appellate Body avoided estab-
lishing a clear-cut rule, stating that, "precisely how much and pre-
cisely what kind of evidence will be required to establish such a
presumption will necessarily vary from measure to measure, provision
to provision, and case to case,"3 1 and that, "the Panel's examination
and weighing of the evidence submitted fall within the scope of the
Panel's discretion as the trier of facts and, accordingly, outside the
scope of appellate review. '32 As time progressed however, demands on
the Appellate Body to establish a more precise rule increased. In the
US - Gambling decision, the Panel made an important step toward the
27 Id at 275.
28 Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Conditions for the Granting of
Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, 106, 115, WT/DS246/AB/R (Apr. 7,
2004) [hereinafter EC - Tariff Preferences]. See generally Decision on Differential
and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity, and Fuller Participation of Develop-
ing Countries, L/4903 (Nov. 28, 1979), GATT B.I.S.D. 26S/203.
29 Worldtradelaw.net Dispute Settlement Commentary, EC-Biotech Products
('GMOs"), at 83-86, www.worldtradelaw.net.
30 id.
31 US - Wool Shirts and Blouses, supra note 17.
32 Appellate Body Report, Korea - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, 161, WT/DS75/
AB/R, WT/DS84AB/R (Jan. 18, 1999) [hereinafter Korea - Alcoholic Beverages].
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establishment of such a rule.3 3 The Panel identified individual mea-
sures and laws not mentioned specifically in the submission, thus ena-
bling Antigua to establish its prima facie case.34 To some extent, the
Panel acted in good faith in its consideration of procedural fairness. In
light of such an obvious deviation however, the Appellate Body chas-
tised the Panel and set forth a general rule that, "at a minimum, the
evidence and arguments underlying a prima facie case must be suffi-
cient to identify the challenged measure and its basic import, identify
the relevant WTO provision and obligation contained therein, and ex-
plain the basis for the claimed inconsistency of the measure with that
provision."3 5 Is this standard clear enough? What is "the challenged
measure" relating to such claims?
III. SETTING THE FRAMEWORK: RULES ON THE BURDEN OF
PROOF
A proper review of the challenges to the decision-making pro-
cess of the panel requires a conceptual analytical framework. For this
analysis, the subject is divided into two parts: 1) how the burden of
proof should be allocated and 2) how the burden of proof should be
discharged.
A. Level I: The Allocation of the Burden of Proof
The Panel must first decide who bears the burden of proof.
Generally, the burden initially lies with the complaining party. The
complaining party must either establish a prima facie case or show an
inconsistency with a particular provision. Once a prima facie case is
established, the burden of proof shifts to the defending party. The de-
fending party must then refute the alleged inconsistency.3 6 An issue
arises when the complaining party brings a claim challenging provi-
sion "A" and provision "B" is invoked by the defending party as a justi-
fication for the measure. In this circumstance, who should bear the
burden of proof regarding provision "B"?
33 Appellate Body Report, United States - Measures Affecting the Cross-Border
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 20, 2005) [here-
inafter US - Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply]. See generally Appellate
Body Report, United States - Laws, Regulations and Methodology for Calculating
Dumping Margins ("Zeroing"), WT/DS294AB/R (May 9, 2006) (addressing the re-
quirements of a prima facie case).
34 US - Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply, supra note 33, at 134-36.
35 Id. at 141.
36 US - Hormones, supra note 21, at [ 98-104.
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1. Basic Principles
A previous study suggested two important principles regarding
the burden of proof." While these rules originate from the same gen-
eral principle of international law, actori incumbit probation, they fre-
quently conflict with one another.3"
Principle 1: The complaining party must prove the alleged violation.
The burden of establishing a violation under Article XXIII:1(a)
of the GATT is on the complaining party. Though it is seldom articu-
lated, this principle is accepted by GATT and WTO DSS and has never
been challenged by WTO Members.3 9 Additionally, Article XXIII:1 of
GATT and Article 6.2 of DSU imply that the complaining party ini-
tially bears the burden.4" This principle is based on a presumption
that WTO Members act in good faith and conform with WTO obliga-
tions.4 ' The party challenging the other Member's action must rebut
this presumption.
Principle 2: A party must meet necessary conditions to invoke an
exception or affirmative defense.
There are circumstances in which the burden of proof shifts to
the defending party; for instance, where the defending party invokes
an exception or an affirmative defense. In this circumstance, the chal-
lenged measure is subjected to stricter scrutiny to ensure that it is
permissive under the exceptional provision.4 2
While this rule has already been used in several GATT
panels 43 and in an early WTO appellate review, 44 it was explicitly con-
37 Pauwelyn, supra note 7, at 237.
38 Id.
39 US-Wool Shirts and Blouses, supra note 17 ("A number of GATT 1947 panel
reports contain language supporting the proposition that the burden of establish-
ing a violation under Article XXIII: 1(a) of the GATT 1947 was on the complaining
party.").
40 See Final Act, supra note 4
41 Decision by the Arbitrators, European Communities - Regime for the Importa-
tion, Sale and Distribution of Bananas - Recourse to Arbitration by the European
Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU, $ 37, WT/DS27/ARB/ECU (Mar. 24,
2000).
42 See Appellate Body Report, Canada - Measures Affecting the Importation of
Milk and the Exportation of Dairy Products - Second Recourse to Article 21.5 of the
DSU by New Zealand and the United States, 74, WT/DS103/AB/RW2, WT/
DS113/AB/RW2 (Jan. 17, 2003) [hereinafter Canada - Dairy] ("This reversal of
usual rules obliges the responding Member to bear the consequences of any doubts
concerning the evidence of export subsidization.").
43 See Panel Report, United States - Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Bever-
ages, $$ 5.43, 5.52, DS23/R (Mar. 16, 1992), GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 206
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firmed by the Appellate Body in US-Wool Shirts and Blouses as the
general rule on the burden of proof,4 5 "falling back" on general princi-
ples of international law.4 6 Although it sounds straightforward, the
distinction between a normal provision and an affirmative defense is
not airtight. In practice, the difference between the two provisions is
blurred, causing debate over whether the disputed provision is actu-
ally an "affirmative defense."
2. Cases: Three Patterns of Rulings
The first principle regarding the burden of proof applies in the
typical situation. Debate over the burden of proof mainly relates to
the application of the second principle. There are three types of adju-
dications by the Appellate Body relating to such controversies.
(a) Type 1: "Affirmative Defence" - GATT Article XX, XI:2(c)(i)
The first type of adjudication involves a provision classified as
an exception or affirmative defense. Early in Appellate Body prece-
dent, Article XX and Article XI:2(c)(i) of GATT were classified as "lim-
ited exceptions" from obligations under certain provisions of GATT,
(1992); Panel Report, Canada - Import Restrictions on Ice Cream and Yoghurt, %
59, L/6568 (Sept. 27, 1989), GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 68 (1989); Panel Report,
European Economic Community - Restrictions on Imports of Dessert Apples, Com-
plaint by Chile, 12.3, L/6491 (Apr. 18, 1989), GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 93
(1989); Panel Report, United States - Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 5.27,
L16439 (Jan. 16 1989), GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 345 (1989); Panel Report,
Japan - Restrictions on Imports of Certain Agricultural Products, 5.1.3.7, L/6253
(Nov. 18, 1987), GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 163 (1988); Panel Report, Canada -
Administration of Foreign Investment Review Act, 5.20, L/5504 (July 25, 1983),
GATT B.I.S.D. (30th Supp.) at 140 (1984).
44 Appellate Body Report, United States - Standards for Reformulated and Con-
ventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/ABJR (Apr. 29, 1996) [hereinafter US - Gasoline].
45 US - Wool Shirts and Blouses, supra note 17 ("Various international tribunals,
including the International Court of Justice, have generally and consistently ac-
cepted and applied the rule that the party who asserts a fact, whether the claim-
ant or the respondent, is responsible for providing proof thereof. Also, it is a
generally accepted canon of evidence in civil law, common law and, in fact, most
jurisdictions that the burden of proof rests upon the party, whether complaining or
defending, who asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or defence.").
46 JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 202, 207-
208 (2003) (noting that this kind of "fall-back" is the necessary consequence of
WTO treaty being part of international law); see also MOJTABA KAZAZI, supra note
1, at 117; M.N. HOWARD, P. CRANE & D.A. HOCHBERG, PHIPSON ON EVIDENCE 52
(Sweet & Maxwell, 14th ed. 1990) ("The burden of proof rests upon the party,
whether plaintiff or defendant, who substantially asserts the affirmative of the
issue.").
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rather than positive rules establishing obligations. 4' The Appellate
Body has never seriously questioned the nature of the provision as an
exception, and has stated that they are "in the nature of affirmative
defenses," and "the burden of establishing such a defense should rest
on the party asserting it." 48 The appellate adjudications in India-
Quantitative Restrictions, Turkey-Textile, and US-FSC concerned pro-
visions classified as affirmative defenses.4 9
(b) Type 2: "Right" - SPS Article 3.3, TBT Article 2.4
The second type of adjudication occurs when the Appellate
Body decides that a provision is an autonomous right. In this instance,
the first burden of proof principle applies rather than an "exception" to
other obligations. Since US-Wool Shirts and Blouses recognized bur-
den shifting as a general principle, parties in WTO dispute settle-
ments tend to raise this issue whenever the provision contains a
suspicious expression.5 ° Subsequent to US-Wool Shirts and Blouses, a
number of Panel and Appellate Body reports have included a separate
heading dealing specifically with the burden of proof.5 1 In an effort to
47 US - Wool Shirts and Blouses, supra note 17; US - Gasoline, supra note 44; see
also Pauwelyn, supra note 7, at 237.
48 US - Wool Shirts and Blouses, supra note 17.
49 Appellate Body Report, India - Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricul-
tural, Textile and Industrial Products, 136, WT/DS90/AB/R, (Aug. 23, 1999)
[hereinafter India - Quantitative Restrictions] ("[If] The complaining party has
successfully established a prima facie case of inconsistency with Article
XVIII... the responding party may, in its defence, either rebut the evidence ad-
duced in support of the inconsistency or invoke the proviso."); Appellate Body Re-
port, Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, 45, WT/
DS34/AB/R (Oct. 22, 1999) (stating that a defense may be invoked under Article
XXIV). It should be noted that this decision stated only the possibility of invoking
as a defense without mentioning the burden shifting clearly. Appellate Body Re-
port, United States - Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations" - Recourse to
Article 21.5 of the DSU by the European Communities, 133, WT/IDS108/AB/RW
(Jan. 14, 2002).
50 See Appellate Body Report, US - Wool Shirts and Blouses, supra note 17.
51 See, e.g. EC - Tariff Preferences, supra note 28; EC - Sardines, supra note 26;
Appellate Body Report, Thailand - Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and
Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H-Beams from Poland, WT/DS122/AB/R
(Mar. 12, 2001); India - Quantitative Restrictions, supra note 49; Appellate Body
Report, Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, WT/DS46/AB/R (Aug.
2, 1999); Appellate Body Report, Korea - Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports
of Certain Dairy Products, WT/DS98/AB/R (June 21, 1999); Appellate Body Report,
Japan - Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, WT/DS76/AB/R (Feb. 22, 1999);
Korea - Alcoholic Beverages, supra note 32; Appellate Body Report, Australia -
Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, WT/DS18/AB/R (Oct. 20, 1998); EC -
Hormones, supra note 21.
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limit the application of the burden shifting rule, the Appellate Body
has struggled to distinguish certain quasi-exceptional provisions stat-
ing such provisions are, "fundamental part of rights and obligations of
WTO members," and are not in the nature of an affirmative defense.5 2
Three cases where the Appellate Body reversed the Panel's decision on
burden shifting demonstrate the Appellate Body's resistance to apply
the second principle 3 .
(c) Type 3: "Special Rule" - AG Article 10.3
Another type of adjudication exists where a provision of a WTO
Agreement expressly provides that the burden of proof is shifted to the
defending party. Strictly speaking, this does not relate to the rules on
burden of proof. Rather, it is simply the interpretation and application
of the treaty itself. For example, Article 10.3 of the Agreement on Ag-
riculture [hereinafter AG] provides a special rule for proof of export
subsidies.5 4 According to the Appellate Body, this provision allocates
the burden of proof to both parties, assigning a quantitative aspect to
the complaining Member and an export subsidization aspect to the re-
sponding Member. 5 5 Where the exports exceed the required quanti-
ties, "the complaining Member is relieved of its burden to establish a
prima facie case of export subsidization."5
3. Key Issue: "Exception" or "Right"
When there is a claim under one WTO provision and the de-
fending party invokes a second provision as a justification for the mea-
sure, the key issue is whether the second provision is an exception or
an autonomous right. It is well established "customary GATT/WTO
practice" that the party invoking the exception carries the burden of
52 For example, although Article 3.1 of SPS Agreement contains the phrase of "ex-
cept as otherwise provided for in this Agreement, and in particular in paragraph
3", the Appellate Body stated that the relationship between Article 3.1 and Article
3.3 is not a "general rule-exception." See EC - Hormones, supra note 21, at 104.
53 See EC - Tariff Preferences, supra note 28, at 104-125; EC - Sardines, supra
note 26, at IT 269-283; EC - Hormones, supra note 21, at %$ 97-109.
54 AG Article 10.3 provides that: "[any Member which claims that any quantity
exported in excess of a reduction commitment level is not subsidized must estab-
lish that no export subsidy, whether listed in Article 9 or not, has been granted in
respect of the quantity of exports in question." See EC - Sardines, supra note 26,
at 104.
55 Appellate Body Report, United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton, T 644-
645, WT/DS267/AB/R (March 21, 2005) [hereinafter US - Upland Cotton]; Canada
- Dairy, supra note 42, at TT 55-77.
56 US - Upland Cotton, supra note 55; Canada - Dairy, supra note 42, at 55-
77.
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proof.5 7 However, many provisions that may be considered exceptions
should instead be viewed as rights. What standards should be used to
distinguish between an exception and a right?
First of all, the relationship between the two provisions is criti-
cal. A provision is not merely a positive rule establishing rights and
obligations. Rather, it can be an exception to the obligations set forth
in other provisions. For this purpose, the Appellate Body distin-
guished between exclusion and exception.5" Even though SPS Article
3.1 contained the term "except," the Appellate Body held that, "differ-
ent from the relationship between Articles I or III and Article XX of
the GATT 1994, Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement simply excludes
from its scope of application the kinds of situations covered by Article
3.3 of that Agreement."5 9 Unfortunately, such a distinction is "not al-
ways... evident and readily applicable."6 ° In EC-Tariff Preferences,
the Appellate Body held that, where one of the provisions: 1) permits
behavior that would be otherwise inconsistent with an obligation in
another provision, or 2) refers to another provision, the complaining
party bears the burden of proving that a measure is inconsistent only
where one of the provisions suggests that the obligation is not
applicable.6 1
In addition to the above standard, the Appellate Body consid-
ers the "carefully negotiated balance of rights and obligations."6 2 Gen-
erally, when an exception clause is invoked by the defending party as a
defense, the burden is shifted to the defending party. However, the
simple characterization of a provision as an exception is not dispositive
of burden of proof issues and, therefore, the Appellate Body considers
additional factors, such as the basic flow of logic. The Appellate Body
has emphasized the importance of the provision in deciding whether to
shift the burden.6 3
When a provision meets the first standard of exception, can the
judge deny the burden shift based on additional considerations? The
Appellate Body's decision in EC - Tariff Preferences, demonstrates the
possibility of such a denial.6 4 In this report, the Appellate Body also
57 See US - Wool Shirts and Blouses, supra note 17.
58 EC - Hormones, supra note 21, at 104.
59 Id.
60 EC - Tariff Preferences, supra note 28, at 88.
61 Id.
62 US - Wool Shirts and Blouses, supra note 17.
63 Id.; see also EC - Tariff Preferences, supra note 28 at 110-115; EC - Hor-
mones, supra note 21, at 104; EC - Sardines, supra note 26, at 271.
64 EC - Tariff Preferences, supra note 28 ("The Enabling Clause plays a vital role
in promoting trade as a means of stimulating economic growth and development.
In this respect, the Enabling Clause is not a typical 'exception' or 'defense' in the
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introduced the concept of due process to attain the goal of rebalancing
and posed the differences between the two standards.6 5
4. Implications
The precedent established in US - Wool Shirts and Blouses has
been followed by the Appellate Body. It is firmly established that the
party invoking an affirmative claim or defense bears the burden of
proof in the WTO jurisprudence. 66 Thus, the burden is shifted to the
defending party when it invokes an exception clause as an affirmative
defense. However, burden shifting is limited to the pure exception
clause, where the provision cannot be alleged as a violation itself be-
cause it does not per se provide the right to Member countries. Even
use of term "except" does not necessarily imply an exception or affirm-
ative defense.
Even with an exception, the judicial bodies may a place a cer-
tain amount of the burden of proof upon the complaining party. De-
spite GATT precedent, the Appellate Body is hesitant to permit such
derogations as they may cause instability in the rules and the realloca-
tion of power.
B. Level II: The Establishment of a Prima Facie Case
At the second stage, the panel decides whether the party dis-
charged its burden of proof. The question at this level is somewhat
different from the first level. Suppose "0" is a totally irrelevant fact
and "10" is irrebuttable evidence. In order to discharge the burden of
proof, what degree of evidence is required? Is "4" sufficient? On the
other hand, considering that the "anchor numbers" were chosen at
random, what kind of rules are necessary to let the judiciary members
of WTO DSS produce a predictable and secure pattern to expel any
doubt of arbitrariness, without any support from written rules?6 7 Ad-
ditionally, how should the judge balance the demand of "predictability"
with the need for procedural "fairness?"6 This section will explore the
answers to these questions.
style of Article XX of the GATT 1994, or of other exception provisions identified by
the Appellate Body in previous cases.").
65 id.
66 MITSUO MATSUSHITA, THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM & PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LAW, PRACTICE AND POLICY 39 (2003).
67 See Charles M. Yablon, A Theory of Presumption, 2 LAw, PROBABILITY & RISK
227, 232 (2003) (suggesting that the perceived importance of burden-shifting rules
may cause decision makers to focus (or 'anchor') on one factor in a multi-factored
decision).
68 See EC - Hormones, supra note 21, at 133 ("A claim that a panel disregarded
or distorted the evidence submitted to it is, in effect, a claim that the panel, to a
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1. The Degree of the Burden: "Sufficient Evidence"
The basic notion in the EC-Hormones decision was that "only
after such a prima facie determination had been made by the panel
may the onus be shifted."6 9 The Greek term of "prima facie," or "at
first appearance," means, "the evidence sufficient to render reasonable
a conclusion in favor of the allegation he asserts."7" How much evi-
dence will be "sufficient" to establish such a prima facie case? As ex-
plained in US-Wool Shirts and Blouses, this "will necessarily vary
from measure to measure, provision to provision, and case to case."7 '
Does this imply there is no fixed rule on the degree of evidence or is
there a general standard for parties to keep in mind when in dispute?
Suppose that the alleged discrimination exists in fact, but the claiming
party does not have full access to effective evidence due to the control
of information by the defending party.7 2 How can the party escape the
procedural insufficiency?
First, it would be insufficient merely to file an entire piece of
legislation and expect a panel to conduct discovery on its own. As the
Appellate Body elaborated in the US-Gambling case, "the evidence
and arguments underlying a prima facie case, therefore, must be suffi-
cient to identify the challenged measure and its basic import, identify
the relevant WTO provision and obligation contained therein, and ex-
plain the basis for the claimed inconsistency of the measure with that
provision."7 3
Second, the scope of the burden of proof is limited to issues of
fact. However, it is generally the duty of the court to know and apply
the law.7 4 In EC-Tariff Preferences, the Appellate Body clarified that,"consistent with the principle of jura novit curia, it is not the responsi-
bility of the European Communities to provide us with the legal inter-
pretation to be given to a particular provision in the Enabling
Clause."7 5
The rules on the requirements for establishing a prima facie
case are less developed than the allocation of the burden of the proof.
greater or lesser degree, denied the party submitting the evidence fundamental
fairness, or what in many jurisdiction is known as due process of law or natural
justice.").
69 Id. at 109.
70 See Georg Nils Herlitz, The Meaning of the Term "Prima Facie", 55 LA. L. REV.
391, 392, 395 (1994).
71 US - Wool Shirts and Blouses, supra note 17, at 11.
72 See generally J. C. Thomas & David Palmeter, The Need for Due Process in
WTO Proceedings, 31 J. WORLD TRADE 45 (1997).
73 US - Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply, supra note 33, at 1 141.
74 See KAzAzI, supra note 1, at 42.
75 EC - Tariff Preferences, supra note 28, at T1 105 (emphasis added).
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Thus, objections to the panel's decisions on the prima facie case often
occurred under Article 11 of the DSU.7 6 The above general disciplines
play an important role in such disputes, as a minimum standard to
assess the legitimacy of the panel's decision.
2. The Scope of the Panel's Discretion
Shifting the angle from the parties to a panel, to what extent
may a panel exercise this tool of presumption? Basically, a panel will
balance all evidence on record and decide whether the party bearing
the original burden of proof has convinced it of the validity of its
claims. In the absence of effective refutation by the defending party, a
panel is required, "as a matter of law, to rule in favour of the com-
plaining party presenting the prima facie case."7 7
Suppose the complaining party submitted the fact "3" which
seems slightly insufficient to be a prima facie case, but the affirmative
finding is necessary to hamper the prevalence of such an alleged dis-
criminatory measure. Considering there is no distinct standard of suf-
ficient evidence, can a panel make use of this procedural device for its
policy goal? On the other hand, suppose an injured developing country
brings a claim against a developed country with unsophisticated and
unspecified written submissions due to the lack of knowledge and re-
sources. Can the panel repair such procedural errors in good faith?
It is generally within the discretion of the panel to decide
which evidence it chooses to utilize in making findings. Thus, the
panel's examination and weighing of the evidence submitted fall"outside the scope of appellate review"7 8 based on Article 17.6 of
DSU.7 9 The Appellate Body, however, did not leave this discretion un-
bridled. In EC-Hormones and many subsequent cases, the Appellate
Body clarified that "the consistency or inconsistency" with the require-
ments of DSU Article 11 is a "legal characterization issue," which"would fall within the scope of appellate review."80
The evolution is not satisfactory yet; nevertheless, the trend is
to render more discretion to the adjudicators, which would go beyond
the consent of Members in the Uruguay Round.
76 Article 11 of the DSU provides that: "... a panel should make an objective
assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts
of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agree-
ments . . ." Final Act, supra note 5.
77 EC - Hormones, supra note 21, at 104. See generally, US - Wool Shirts and
Blouses, supra note 17, at 14.
78 Korea - Alcoholic Beverages, supra note 32, at 161.
79 Article 17.6 of the DSU states, "[aln appeal shall be limited to issues of law
covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel."80 EC - Hormones, supra note 21, at 132.
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IV. CASE APPLICATION: EC-BIOTHECH
In previous sections, I discussed the evolving rules on the bur-
den of proof, formed the two-level framework, and spotted key issues.
In this section, I will try to apply these findings to the most recent
case, EC-Biotech, which provides a vivid description of how the panel
exercises its tool.8 1
A. Case Brief
In September 2006, the Panel released the bulky but highly
qualified report on the EC's GMO moratorium and safeguard mea-
sures, which was carefully crafted, extremely analytical, and very well
reasoned.s2
In this case, the US brought the claim on the EC's safeguard
measures under Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement8 3 , whereas EC ar-
gued that since the challenged safeguards are provisional measures
consistent with Article 5.7,4 the US has the burden of establishing a
prima facie case of inconsistency with Article 5.7. Thus, the issue was
whether the successful claim brought under Article 5.1 could be ac-
cepted as a prima facie case to the measures under Article 5.7.
Concerning the allocation of the burden, it was critical to de-
cide whether Article 5.7 was an "affirmative defence." The Panel thor-
oughly examined whether the relationship between Article 5.1 and
Article 5.7 was a "general-exception" or "exclusion (qualified right),"
81 EC - Biotech, supra note 25.
82 This case was brought by the United States and Canada alleging that a number
of EC member States maintain national marketing and import bans on biotech
products even though those products have already been approved by the EC for
import and marketing in the EC.
83 Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement provides: "Members shall ensure that their
sanitary or phytosanitary measures are based on an assessment, as appropriate to
the circumstances, of the risks to human, animal or plant life or health, taking
into account risk assessment techniques developed by the relevant international
organizations." The WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phys-
tosanitary Measures , Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex la, Legal Instruments - Results of the Uru-
guay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994)[hereinafter SPS], available at http://www.wto.
org/english/tratop-e/sps-e/spsagr-e.htm.
84 Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement provides: "In cases where relevant scientific
evidence is insufficient, a Member may provisionally adopt sanitary or phytosani-
tary measures on the basis of available pertinent information, including that from
the relevant international organizations as well as from sanitary or phytosanitary
measures applied by other Members. In such circumstances, Members shall seek
to obtain the additional information necessary for a more objective assessment of
risk and review the sanitary or phytosanitary measure accordingly within a rea-
sonable period of time." SPS Art. 5.7.
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and concluded that Article 5.7 was a "qualified right" rather than an"exception," requiring the claiming party to establish a prima facie
case.8 5
When addressing whether the complaining parties have met
their burden of establishing a prima facie case of inconsistency with
Article 5.7 in respect of the relevant safeguard measures, the Panel
stated that: "in the specific circumstances of this case, the critical legal
issue in our view is whether the relevant safeguard measures meet the
requirements set out in the text of Article 5.1, not whether they are
consistent with Article 5.7. " 6 The Panel held that the claiming par-
ties established the prima facie case of inconsistency with Article 5.7.
The European Union announced that it would not appeal.8 7
However, this does not necessarily mean that the Panel's decision was
without error. The following section examines the decision from a crit-
ical perspective.
B. Case Analysis in a Critical Perspective
It might be inappropriate to make an immature criticism on
the fine-tuned masterpiece, but I believe a sound criticism will furnish
a stepping stone for the evolution. Two questions arise: whether the
Panel reached a logically proper conclusion ("legal analysis"), and
whether this decision properly balanced the goals of WTO DSS ("politi-
cal analysis").
1. Legal Analysis
The Panel's reasoning is legally well-supported but somewhat
distorted. For this analysis, I split the Panel's holding into two parts:
the allocation of the burden of proof (Level I) and the issue of whether
the complaining party established the prima facie case under Article
5.7 (Level II).
On 'Level I', the main question was who should bear the bur-
den to prove the inconsistency of the measure with Article 5.7. The
term "except" in Article 5.1 triggers the suspicion that Article 5.7
might be interpreted as an "exception." Also, the previous Panel of
Japan-Apple8 8 recognized Article 5.7 as an "exception," which was not
discussed in the appellate review. On the contrary, the Appellate
Body has reversed the Panel's progressive holdings on similar provi-
85 Panel Report, EC - Biotech, supra note 105, at 7.2976.
86 Id. at 7.3006.
87 EU Decides Against WTO GMO Panel Appeal, U.S. Presses for Approvals, IN-
SIDE US TRADE, Nov. 24, 2006.
88 Panel Report, Japan - Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples, WT/
DS245/R July 15, 2003, upheld by Appellate Body Report, WT/DS245/AB/R (Nov.
26, 2003).
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sions in EC-Hormones (SPS Article 3.3) and EC-Sardines (TBT Article
2.4). The adjudication of the Panel in this case manifests complete def-
erence to the precedents made by the Appellate Body. The Panel ex-
amined previous rulings of the Appellate Body, including EC-
Hormones, Japan-Agricultural Product II, EC-Sardines, Japan-Apple
and EC-Tariff Preferences.9 Then, the Panel decided not to admit the"exception." The Panel was justified in reversing the decision in Ja-
pan-Apple.
On "Level II", however, the Panel seems to have made ill use of
its discretion. The Panel de facto unjustly exempted the complaining
parties from the burden of proof regarding the Article 5.7 violation,
stating that a measure under Article 5.7 would be a breach of Article
5.1 where it does not fulfill the requirements of Article 5.7. More in-
terestingly, the Panel held that, based on the existence of several risk
assessment reports of European Commission, the US and Argentina"established a presumption that Austria's safeguard measure was im-
posed in respect of a situation where relevant scientific evidence was
not insufficient", and conferred the burden of rebutting this presump-
tion to the EC.9 °
2. Political Analysis
The pre-existing perception and political consideration of the
Panel seem to have prevailed over the strict application of the rules.
The challenged measures are of two kinds: moratoriums and safe-
guards. More interestingly, procedural issues were the critical thresh-
old in both claims: measure and "prima facie case." Since the Panel
rejected moratorium claims by reason of measure, it might be difficult
to deny safeguards claims based on other procedural reasons.
The Panel of EC-Biotech struggled to balance the tension be-
tween deferring to the words of the higher tribunal (the goal of "pre-
dictability") and exercising its discretion to reflect the policy object (the
goal of "rebalancing"). The key issue was whether the complaining
party could justify the claim to establish a prima facie case of Article
5.1 to the measures based on Article 5.7, where the relationship be-
tween Article 5.1 and 5.7 is not a "general-exception." Considering the
Appellate Body has shown strong resistance to extend the rule of bur-
den shifting, the Panel could not make a pragmatic decision on the
issue of "Level I." But, in "Level II," since there is no fixed standard of
the degree of evidence, the Panel could reflect its policy goal without
deviating from the precedent of the Appellate Body by justifying the
insufficient prima facie case.
89 Panel Report, EC-Biotech, supra note 29, at 1$ 7.2962-2997.
90 Id. at 7.3273
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V. CONCLUSION
The burden of proof rests upon the party who makes the claim
(actori incumbit probation). In case of an affirmative defense, that
burden will be shifted to the defending party. It sounds so simple, but
in a real dispute, this shift is very controversial since it grants great
advantages to the claimant. This "quasi-discretionary tool" is a two-
edged sword, which can be both an effective device to enhance imple-
mentation and a factor threatening to ruin the judicial system, de-
pending on how it is used. In this regard, nation states tend to
formulate the written rules or well-established doctrines on the bur-
den shift.
The WTO DSS does not have written rules on that subject.
However, that does not mean that there are no rules on the burden of
proof. Astonishingly, the judicial system of WTO has taken on a life of
its own, by creating precedent on the burden of proof. Such evolution
is not new, but is expanding quickly. In an era where the amendment
of treaty looks gloomy, this "gap-filling" or "bottom-up" rule-making by
the judicial bodies carries a prime significant meaning to Member
countries, as well as the WTO DSS.
This evolution has not occurred in vacuum or in disorder. The
Appellate Body drew a meager concept from general principle of inter-
national law. It then reinforced the rules carefully and gradually, re-
flecting divergent alternative views arising from the tensions between
the sovereignty and the judicial discretion, as well as between the goal
of predictability and the goal of fairness. In such a process of trial and
error, we can detect a strong use of precedent, which would create a
significant impact on the traditional concept of international law.
As a matter of policy, three implications may arise. First, the
questions on the burden of proof remain open-ended such that results
are determined on a case-by-case basis, in response to factually diverse
inquires. In such circumstances, reliance on prior decisions is neces-
sary in minimizing the possible deterioration of the disciplines and to
ensure that the rules develop objectively, rather than becoming subject
to the whims of individuals. Second, the power of decision-making
owned by judicial bodies of WTO DSS should be carefully exercised. In
certain instances, the Panels and Appellate Body have to take the "role
of a prophet" and seek to forecast how these rules will evolve. Thus,
they should be aware of their important role when producing the rul-
ing. The Panel's decision in EC-Biotech must be criticized carefully
because it generated a legal ambiguity and confusion of the rules,
rather than simply evolving the current rule-based system. Finally,
the evolving rules on burden of proof demonstrate the dynamic nature
of WTO law, which is an example of constitutional thinking.
